THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL SOYBEAN MARKET: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? by Bolling, H. Christine et al.
The United States in the Global Soybean Market: Where Do We go From Here? 
by 
Christine Bolling
*, Agapi Somwaru*, and Jamie Brown Kruse** 
 
American Agricultural Economics Association Meetings 
Chicago, IL 
















                                                            
*  Agricultural Economists, Economic Research Service, USAD, Washington, DC. 
** Professor, Department of Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX.   2 
 
 
The United States in the Global Soybean Market: Where Do We go From Here? 
by 
Christine Bolling





This study applies the concept of a dynamic dominant-firm oligopoly model to the 
international soybean market. It has been suggested that the international soybean market 
should be viewed as an oligopoly among exporting nations. Consistent with Gaskins 
(1971) dynamic dominant firm model, our results indicate that the current U.S. loan 
deficiency-payment prices and their predecessors created an environment in which 
smaller (fringe) exporters could prosper and expand. The reduction of U.S. market share 
is thus a logical outcome of an  “optimally managed decline” a la Gaskins.  The study 
finds U.S. market share to decline at a reducing rate and predicts U.S. market share 
eventually to stabilize, given the expanding international market for soybeans and 
products.  Recognition of the structure of international soybean market has policy 
implications for the 2002 farm program as the classic dominant firm model suggests.  
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The United States in the Global Soybean Market: Where Do We go From Here? 
 
The United States, the leading producer, had a dominant market share of the international 
soybean and product market
1 for decades.  Argentina and Brazil were smaller 
competitors.  This study traces the history of the changing market shares of the United 
States in the international soybean market and examines the underlying market structure 
in which the United States is operating in the context of Gaskin’s (1971) dynamic 
dominant firm model.  Looking at the international market in an oligopoly framework 
reveals important implications for policymakers in setting support prices in the next 
round of the U.S. Farm Bill. 
Since the 1980’s, Argentina and Brazil have captured a growing share of the 
international soybean and product market.  In 1998, these two countries accounted for 45 
percent of the international soybean market in terms of soybean equivalents for soybeans, 
soybean oil, and soybean meal, while the United States accounted for 29 percent.  The 
United States, with 55 percent of the market in 1980, saw its share initially decline and 
then stabilize (figure 1).  While the market grew, nominal and real prices for soybeans 
declined in the international market, as measured by the c.i.f. Rotterdam prices for 
soybeans (figure 2). 
Looking at the costs of production, soybeans in Argentina and Brazil, and their 
costs of getting soybeans to the international soybean market in Rotterdam, are 
competitive with the United States (Dohlman, 2000).  At the farm, per bushel total 
production costs in the main producing areas of the U.S. Midwest amounted to $5.49 a 
                                                            
1 From here, soybean market means soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal expressed in soybean equivalents for 
simplicity of reading.   4 
bushel, compared with $3.63 a bushel in Mato Grosso and $4.33 a bushel in Parana state 
of Brazil.  Per acre costs in Brazil demonstrate a similar comparative advantage.  While 
variable costs in the United States are lower, fixed costs, particularly land, are higher than 
in Mato Grosso and Parana.  Transportation costs from the farm to the international 
market in Rotterdam close much of the price advantage of Brazilian and Argentine 
farmers, compared to U.S. farmers.  As recently as 1998, Ketelhohn estimated that U.S. 
soybean delivery costs to Rotterdam were higher than Argentina’s but lower than 
Brazil’s. 
This study looks at soybean producing nations as oligopolists, rather than 
exporting nations, a change from the net trade model, the more typical way of viewing 
the international soybean market. By viewing the market in this way, one is able to 
ascribe certain characteristics to the market.  Early studies by Carter, et al., (1994), and 
McCall, et al., (1981) suggested that the international grain market should be viewed as 
an oligopoly among exporting nations.  While wheat was often employed as the example, 
the same argument can be applied to soybean exports.  By viewing the market as an 
oligopoly, one is able to describe the actions of a dominant country in relation to fringe 
countries using a dynamic approach.  
The classic static dominant firm model shows that when a dominant company 
supports its product price at a noncompetitive level, it leaves room for fringe companies 
to prosper and gain market share over time, eventually eroding the position of the 
dominant company.  In contrast, this study employs the dynamic model developed by 
Gaskins (1971) and applies it to the international soybean market.  The Gaskins model is 
a unique framework as it pertains to a growing market where the dominant firm maintains   5 
a stable market share, as long as the market grows.  Furthermore, the model 
accommodates for a wide range of differences in the relative cost of production between 
the dominant firm and the fringe firms, even for cases where the dominant firm lacks a 
cost advantage.   
In the next section we summarize models of a dominant firm with a competitive 
fringe and examine the implications of these models.  We look at the static model and 
secondly, we apply the Gaskins (1971) dynamic model to capture the dominant firm’s in 
a growing market.  Lastly, we examine the policy implications for the proposed 2002 
farm bill.  The Gaskins model implies that the setting of the loan deficiency payment has 




As we have defined the issue, the main problem faced by U.S. soybean exporters was 
market penetration by fringe firms—or in this case, smaller exporters.
3 The smaller 
exporters simply respond to the existing price but individually cannot influence price  
(Scherer and Ross, 1990).   In the static model, the dominant firm knows the fringe 
supply curve, which is the horizontal summation of the fringe firms’ marginal cost 
curves, and incorporates the fringe supply into its decision. Thus, the dominant firm 
maximizes profit given the residual market demand.  Market price (determined by the 
dominant firm’s actions) is above marginal cost in the static or short-run model.  
                                                            
2  In recent years the loan deficiency payment price (LDP) has become the floor price to U.S. grain and oilseed 
producers, but was operational in soybeans only since 1998.  In recent years, the loan deficiency payment was set as a 
percent of the simple average price received by producers for the immediately preceding 5 crops (USDA Farm 
Service Agency Fact Sheet).  In the formulation, the highest and lowest prices are excluded, but the LDP rate is not to 
exceed $5.26 per bushel and not to be less than $4.92 per bushel.  
3 The international soybean market is mostly characterized by the presence of a few oligopolistic firms that operate 
worldwide.  In this study, we treat the countries where the firms are originated as oligopolists, rather than the firms.   6 
The international soybean market is a more stylized case (figure 3), where the 
dominant country has lost any cost advantage that would have precluded others from 
entering the international market.  DD is market demand, SF is the fringe supply schedule, 
and MC is the dominant firm’s marginal cost curve.  The dominant firm incorporates the 
fringe supply schedule into market demand to construct residual demand ABD over 
which it is the effective monopolist. Using standard first order conditions, the dominant 
firm would supply QD  at the market price PD  and the fringe would supply Q - QD .  In this 
case, by virtue of its position of market power, the dominant firm takes on the 
responsibility of restricting supply to the market.  But the result of this is that the fringe 
can free ride on the big firm’s price enhancing efforts.  
In the static model, the fringe supply will increase in the long run if the market 
price yields excess rents to the fringe.  If fringe supply increases, then the dominant 
firm’s captive residual demand shrinks and its market share dwindles (fig. 3).  The 
current soybean case is like figure 3, where production (plus transportation) costs in the 
fringe countries are as low or lower than production (plus transportation) costs of the 
dominant country. With the supply price of the fringe countries approaching the market 
price generated by the demand curve ABD and the dominant firm’s marginal cost curve 
(MC), the chance of the dominant firm making excess profits disappears. The static 
model predicts, ceteris paribus, greater penetration over time by fringe firms. If demand 
is constant, the fringe expansion will effectively crowd out the dominant firm. 
The Gaskins dynamic limit pricing model (1971) accomodates a growing market 
and a dominant firm that has higher costs of production than the fringe firms.  He sets up 
a case where even a very moderate rate of growth in the product market can ensure   7 
stabilezed market share for all participants in the market, a more optimistic outcome than 
that of the static model.  Gaskins shows that depending on the discount factor and the 
original size of the fringe, the dominant firm will choose either a limit price or a price 
trajectory that declines towards the limit price.  
 
The Model 
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where V is the present value of the firm’s profit stream, p(t) is product price, c is average 
total cost of production, q(p(t),t) and r are the dominant producer’s output and discount 
rate respectively.  Assume that the dominant producer’s current sales can be represented 
as follows 
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where f(p) is initial demand, γ is the market growth rate, and x(t) is the level of fringe 
sales.  The rate of entry/expansion by fringe producers depends on the market price. The 
entry response coefficient, k, is a growing exponential function of time. Assume p is the 
limit price (the price that yields a fringe supply equal to zero, see fig. 3), and x0 is the 
initial output of the competitive fringe.   
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In the control theory framework, x(t) --the level of rival sales-- is the state variable, and 
p(t) --or product price--- is the control variable.  We can collect terms to state the 
dominant producer’s optimal control problem as:  
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The necessary conditions generate the simultaneous differential equations, 
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γ   and z* (t) is the optimal 
shadow price of additional rival entry  and is necessarily negative. 
 
Eliminating nonsense trajectories leaves two optimal paths.  This model demonstrates 
that as p(t) and w(t) (where w(t) = x(t)e-γ t) reach their equilibrium levels, the dominant 
firm’s share approaches a constant.   The optimal pricing strategy which is greater than 
the limit price yields a constant long-run market share for the dominant firm s(t) where 
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Where f(p) is the total demand of the market and w(t) is some optimal portion of the 
market supplied by the fringe countries. In this model, a firm with no cost advantage will 
not price itself out of the market. Gaskins demonstrates that if the curvature of the   9 
demand curve is not too great, an increase in the growth rate of the market will always 
increase the dominant firm’s market share. This allows the dominant firm (or country) 
with insignificant cost advantages to “maintain a constant market share over the long 
haul” (Gaskins, pg. 137). 
In sum, by applying the Gaskins model that pertains to a growing market and a 
dominant firm that has lost its cost advantages over fringe countries, we can conclude 
from this special case that even a very moderate rate of growth in the product market 




In this section, we analyze the behavior of the dominant as well as the fringe participant 
countries’ growth and production patterns in the soybean market.  We empirically 
estimate the growth pattern, the speed of convergence and the stability of the global 
soybean market.  We assess this by estimating the following growth equation:  
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where sit are the market shares of the dominant and the fringe countries, the subscript i 
denotes the county, the subscript t denotes the year while u is the random disturbance.   
Using the market shares of the soybean equivalent, which includes soy-oil and soy-meal, 
we estimated equation (10).  The results clearly indicate that although the United States is 
the dominant country in the soybean market, the market shares of the United States, 
Argentina, and Brazil have converged and stabilized (see Table 1). 
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The estimated β  converge for the entire period and for the two sub-periods is positive 
implying that the market shares are converging. During the longer time span, the effect of 
the initial position of the dominant country declined and the market shares of the fringe 
countries grew faster than the dominant country.  The β  converge of the two sub-periods 
1980-89 and 1990-98 is almost the same (0.099 and 0.093, respectively).  The estimated 
σ  converge, measured by the variance of the regression, captures the dispersion of the 
process or the degree of uneven growth.  For the entire period (1980-98) the market 
converged with minimal dispersion.  The estimated σ  converge was also nearly the same 
for the two subperiods, indicating that the market grew with about the same degree of 
variability during the 1980’s as in the 1990’s.  
We also estimated the rate of convergence of soybeans, soy-oil, and soy-meal 
separately for each product.  The estimated growth pattern of soybeans followed the same 
pattern of convergence as the soybean equivalent.  The results of the soy-oil and soy-
meal, however, are not very significant, indicating that the soybean by-products are 
affected by immediate market conditions.  The rate of domestic use and the relationship 
between soybean oil and other vegetable oils help determine soybean oil exports. 
Domestic feed use for poultry and pork and the international demand for pork and poultry   11 
help determine soybean meal exports. Relative prices between soybeans and by-products 
also affect the decision to export raw soybeans or products to the international market.       
 
Policy Implications 
The Gaskins model would indicate that the U.S. market share could be stable as the 
overall market grows. But if there is no growth, as the static textbook model indicates, the 
U.S. dominant position could erode completely. There is perhaps some opportunity for 
supply management between the United States, Argentina, and Brazil to shore up 
international prices, if indeed such a prospect were allowed by international organizations 
such as the World Trade Organization.  As the fringe countries, in this case, Argentina 
and Brazil, acquire a larger market share, any price or supply management policy 
initiated solely by the United States becomes less effective and more costly to administer.  
In this regard the interplay between the United States, Argentina, and Brazil becomes a 
very important factor in writing the 2002 U.S. farm bill in regard to soybeans. This study 
also demonstrates that U.S. policymakers, using loan deficiency payment prices, and the 
United States, acting as the dominant supplier, and other countries acting as fringe 
suppliers, kept the dominant share of the market for the United States during the 1990’s.  
By keeping loan deficiency payment prices high, U.S. policy encouraged soybean 
production, providing a large supply of soybeans and products to international markets.  
If indeed, the United States had experienced lower production, the U.S. market share 
would have declined further. 
   12 
Conclusions 
The soybean and soybean product market is growing, but the U.S. market share is lower 
than it was in 1980. After hitting a low in 1994, the U.S. market share stabilized for 
several years. Nominal and real prices declined in the international market as market 
supplies exceeded demand for soybeans and soybean products. Our empirical model 
shows that market shares converged in the late 1990’s.  The convergence suggests that 
the Gaskins model of a dominant firm is the appropriate way to look at the international 
soybean market.   
Apparently Argentina and Brazil see themselves as price takers, or “fringe firms” in the 
international market.  There is no indication that Argentina or Brazil limited production 
to maintain a stable international market price. The increased production and trade by the 
major producers precludes that conclusion. Until the present, U.S. policymakers, by using 
the loan deficiency payment, maintained the U.S. market share. 
From the static model, one could conclude that there is no way out for the U.S. soybean 
industry. The Gaskins model for an expanding market is more optimistic in its outcome.  
A dominant firm with no cost advantage does not necessarily price itself out of the 
market, but instead maintains a constant market share over the long haul. This study 
demonstrates that unless a policy maker looked at the case of a growing market as 
described by Gaskins, his view of the soybean market would be much too pessimistic. 
One sticky problem, however, is that as long as the major players operate as they have, 
any U.S. attempt to unilaterally maintain domestic support prices becomes more and 
more expensive.     13 
References 
Carlos, Ann M. and Jamie Brown Kruse. “The decline of the Royal African Company: 
fringe firms and the role of the charter,” Economic History Review, XLIX, No. 2, pp. 
291-313, 1996.    
 
Carter, Colin Andre, and Donald MacLaren.  “Alternative oligopolistic structures in 
international commodity markets: price or quantity competition?” IATRC Working Paper 
94-4, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, St. Paul, MN, 1994.  
 
Dohlman, Erik.  “Production and marketing costs for Argentina and Brazilian soybeans in 
the international market,” Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Association Meetings, NAREA 2000, Whispering Pines Conference Center, University 
of Rhode Island, June 13, 2000. 
 
Gaskins, D.W., Jr., “Dynamic limit pricing: optimal pricing under the threat of  
entry,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, pp. 306-22, 1971. 
 
Ketelhohn, Werner, Maron Moncayo, and Bernard Allen. “Competitiveness in the Latin 
American Oilseed Industry.” Instituto Centroamericano de Administracion de Empresas 
(INCAE, Latin American Center for Competitiveness and Sustainable Development), 
Costa Rica, 1998. 
 
McCall, Alex F., and Timothy E. Josling, eds.  Imperfect Markets and Agricultural 
Trade, Osmun Allanheld, Montclair, NJ, 1981. 
 
Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Princeton, 1990. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Oil Crops, Situation and 
Outlook Yearbook, OCS-1999, Oct. 1999. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency. Fact Sheet, Soybeans and  
Minor Oilseeds, July 1998.   14 
Fig. 1-- Market shares of the United States, Brazil, and Argentina in
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Fig. 3--Static model of dominant firm with competitive fringe
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